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he focus on minimizing liability is a growing trend in our society.  
For some products, simple warnings or safety devices are enough 
to offer protection to the manufacturer.  For other items, such as real 
property, minimizing potential liability can be extremely difficult or 
impose substantial cost on the landowner.  What happens if you allow 
a person to use your land for recreational purposes and he or she is 
injured in the process?  Who is liable for the injury?  Should the 
landowner be held responsible?  Does it matter whether the person 
using the land paid the landowner for such use?  These questions 
present an important issue, one the Oregon Legislature sought to 
address. 
In 1995, the Oregon State Legislature established a set of statutes 
giving rise to a recreational immunity for landowners.  These statutes 
functioned to grant public and private landowners immunity from 
claims in tort or contract that arise from recreational use of land1 
when the landowner has not charged for permission to use its land.2  
In support of these statutes, the legislature explicitly provided that it is 
 
1 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682(1) (2005) (amended 2009). 
2 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.688(2)(a) (2005) (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 
105.688(2)(b) (2009)). 
T
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the public policy of the state to encourage landowners to allow public 
access to their land for recreational purposes by limiting landowner 
liability to users of their land for such recreational purposes.3 
On September 24, 2009, the Oregon Supreme Court held four-to-
three in Coleman v. Oregon Parks and Recreation Department that 
the State of Oregon was not able to invoke the recreational immunity 
provided under ORS 105.682(1) to defend against an action by a 
person who was injured while using state land for which a fee was 
imposed.4  The particular parcel of state land upon which the plaintiff 
was injured contained two areas, one requiring payment of a usage fee 
and another that was open to use by the public without charge.5  The 
Oregon Supreme Court noted that both areas were contained in the 
same undivided parcel.6  As such, a fee to use one portion precluded 
invocation of the immunity for the entire parcel.7  The court’s holding 
reversed the Oregon Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the State.8 
The court’s holding in Coleman, that a fee charged to use one 
portion of a parcel of land constitutes a waiver as to the entire parcel, 
is troubling because it could create anomalous results and leaves 
significant ambiguity regarding clearly divided-parcel cases and what 
constitutes a usage fee. 
This Note discusses Coleman, analyzing the majority and 
dissenting opinions and the implications of the court’s holding.  To 
this end, Part I discusses the statutory law that provides the 
background for the present case.  Part II discusses statutory 
interpretation under Oregon law.  Parts III and IV discuss the facts of 
the case and the procedural history, respectively.  Part V discusses the 
court’s holding and the rationale provided by both the majority and 
dissenting opinions.  Finally, Part VI discusses the implications of the 
two rationales and the issues that may arise from the court’s decision. 
 
3 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.676 (2005) (amended 2009). 
4 Coleman v. Or. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 347 Or. 94, 104, 217 P.3d 651, 656 (2009). 
5 See id. at 96, 217 P.3d at 652. 
6 Id. at 103–04, 217 P.3d 656. 
7 See id. at 102, 217 P.3d at 656. 
8 Id. at 104, 217 P.3d at 656. 
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I 
BACKGROUND LAW 
The decision in Coleman places critical importance on the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of applicable Oregon statutes.  Three 
statutes were implicated in this case: ORS 105.682(1), former ORS 
105.688(2)(a), and ORS 105.672(1).  This Note will use the statutory 
language in effect in 2005, as it was the law when the accident 
occurred and was the law the court applied. While these statutes were 
originally adopted in 1995 and have been revised as recently as 2009, 
some undergoing multiple alterations during this fifteen-year period, 
amendments adopted after 2005 are not materially relevant to the 
issues decided in Coleman.  Additionally, these statutes have not been 
previously interpreted by a court under similar facts. 
A.  Statutes Establishing Recreational Immunity 
1.  ORS 105.682: Liability of Owner of Land Used by Public for 
Recreational Purposes, Woodcutting, or Harvest of Special Forest 
Products 
ORS 105.682(1) creates the “recreational immunity” for 
landowners, which states that an “owner of land is not liable in 
contract or tort for any personal injury, death or property damage that 
arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes, . . . when 
the owner of land either directly or indirectly permits any person to 
use the land for recreational purposes.”9 However, the statute 
conditions invocation of the immunity by further stating that “[t]he 
limitation on liability provided by this section applies if the principal 
purpose for entry upon the land is for recreational purposes.”10  
Finally, the statute indicates the immunity “is not affected if the 
injury, death or damage occurs while the person entering land is 
engaging in activities other than the use of the land for recreational 
purposes.”11 
Considerable case law exists regarding ORS 105.682, but much of 
it discusses liability for a landowner’s failure to warn of a danger.  
One particularly interesting interpretation of the law can be found in 
Liberty v. State, where the court held that the immunity does not 
apply to landowners of one parcel who allow passage on their land to 
 
9 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682(1) (2005) (amended 2009). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
 2010] Oregon’s Recreational Immunity in the Wake of 729 
Coleman v. Oregon Parks and Recreation Department 
access the land of another where the second parcel was used for 
recreational purposes.12  In Liberty, the Oregon Supreme Court held 
that, despite the fact that the first parcel was used to reach the second 
parcel, which was to be used for a recreational purpose, using the first 
parcel to reach the second was not a recreational use of the first 
parcel.13  Therefore, the immunity would not apply to the landowner 
of the first parcel.14 
2.  ORS 105.688: Applicability of Immunities from Liability for 
Owner of Land; Restrictions 
ORS 105.688(2)(a) limited the immunity provided in ORS 
105.682(1) by precluding application of the immunity in cases where 
the landowner charged a fee to use the land.  The statute declares that 
the immunities provided by ORS 105.682 apply only if “[t]he owner 
makes no charge for permission to use the land.”15  While “charge” is 
a defined term under ORS 105.672(1), the meaning of “the land” is 
less than obvious.  The meaning of “the land” is critical because it 
determines how far the immunity extends.  Does the immunity apply 
only to the specific portion of the land where the recreational activity 
for which the fee was paid was taking place?  Does it apply to all of 
the land contained within that particular parcel?  Unfortunately, there 
is limited case law interpreting this statute. 
3.  ORS 105.672: Definitions for ORS 105.672 to 105.696 
ORS 105.672(1) provides the definition of “charge” as it is used in 
ORS 105.688(2)(a), explaining that “‘Charge’ [m]eans the admission 
price or fee asked by any owner in return for permission to enter or go 
upon the owner’s land.”16  Although ORS 105.672(1) seeks to define 
“charge,” some uncertainty remains.  What constitutes a “fee”?  Does 
a fee charged for a permit entitling the holder to use multiple parcels 
constitute a fee to enter or go upon any of the individual parcels?  As 
highlighted previously, how is “the land” defined?  The definitions of 
these critical terms could quite easily be the dispositive factor in 
 
12 Liberty v. State, 342 Or. 11, 21, 148 P.3d 909, 914 (2006). 
13 Id. at 21–22, 148 P.3d at 914. 
14 Id. at 22, 148 P.3d at 914. 
15 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.688(2)(a) (2005) (amended 2009). 
16 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.672(1) (2005) (amended 2009). 
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determining the outcome of an action.  Again, case law discussing 
this statute and the meaning of these terms is sparse. 
These three statutes seemingly address the issues presented in this 
case.  However, despite the apparent clarity of the statutes, the present 
case illustrates that there is considerable ambiguity in terms such as 
“charge,” “the land,” and “recreational purposes.”  Despite the court’s 
best efforts, much of this uncertainty appears to remain.  This 
ambiguity is explored further in Part VI, the implications section of 
this Note, following the discussion of the majority and dissenting 
opinions. 
II 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Statutory interpretation is a critical issue in Coleman.  Statutory 
interpretation is the process of interpreting legislation to decipher 
legislative intent.  While this process establishes what the court 
believes to be the legislature’s intent, it is an inherently messy area of 
the law.  Any case involving a statute requires some level of statutory 
interpretation; however, determining legislative intent can be a 
challenging proposition.  The Oregon Supreme Court attempted to 
provide guidance in Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of 
Labor & Industries (PGE v. BOLI) by indicating that it is a court’s 
responsibility to discern the legislature’s intent.17  To facilitate such 
analysis, the court established a three-step process.18 
The first level of analysis begins with an examination of the text 
and context of the statute.19  The text of the statute is the starting 
point and provides the best evidence of legislative intent.20  In 
conducting the textual analysis, the court should apply rules of 
statutory construction found in statutes and case law, including rules 
like not inserting what has been omitted or omitting what has been 
inserted21 and “words of common usage typically should be given 
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”22  The court must also 
 
17 Portland Gen. Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 
1143, 1145 (1993), superseded by statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020, as recognized in 
State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 171-72, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050-51 (2009). 
18 Id. at 610–12, 859 P.2d at 1145–46. 
19 Id. at 610, 859 P.2d at 1146. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 611, 859 P.2d at 1146 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2005)). 
22 Id. 
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consider the context of the statute, “includ[ing] additional provisions 
of the same statute and other related statutes.”23  Similar to the textual 
analysis, the court must apply rules when analyzing the statute’s 
context.24  Some such rules include “where there are several 
provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be 
adopted as will give effect to all,”25 that “a particular intent shall 
control a general one that is inconsistent with it,”26 that “use of a term 
in one section and not in another section of the same statute indicates 
a purposeful omission,”27 and that “use of the same term throughout a 
statute indicates that the term has the same meaning throughout the 
statute.”28  If the legislature’s intent is clear from the first level of the 
analysis, no further inquiry is required.29 
The second level of analysis is only used when the first level does 
not provide a clear understanding of legislative intent.30  In the 
second level, the court examines legislative history to help determine 
legislative intent.31  The court must combine the understanding 
derived from reviewing the legislative history with the insight gained 
from the first level analysis to determine legislative intent.32  If the 
legislature’s intent is clear after the second level analysis, the inquiry 
stops.33 
Where the legislative intent is still unclear after the second level 
analysis, the court must apply the third and final analysis.34  Under 
the third level analysis, the court applies general maxims of statutory 
construction to resolve remaining uncertainty.35  An example of such 
a maxim is that where legislative history does not exist, “the court 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2005)). 
26 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (2005)). 
27 Id. (citing Emerald People’s Util. Dist. v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 302 Or. 256, 269, 
729 P.2d 552, 560 (1986)). 
28 Id. (citing Or. Racing Comm’n v. Multnomah Kennel Club, 242 Or. 572, 584, 411 
P.2d 63, 68 (1966)). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 611–12, 859 P.2d at 1146. 
32 Id. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1146. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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will attempt to determine how the legislature would have intended the 
statute to be applied had it considered the issue.”36 
By its very nature, the process of statutory interpretation is 
extremely subjective, making determination of what was intended by 
the legislature highly dubious and open to debate.  This debate lies at 
the heart of the present case, with the majority holding that the 
statutes’ references to “the land” refer to the entire parcel of land and 
the dissent arguing that “the land” refers to a specific portion of the 
land contained within the parcel. 
III 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Bradley and Bonnie Coleman were visiting William M. Tugman 
State Park (Tugman Park) along the Oregon coast.37  The state 
imposes a fee to camp at Tugman Park, but it does not charge to enter 
the park or to use the park’s trails.38  On the day the incident 
occurred, Mr. Coleman was staying overnight in the campground.39  
While riding his bike on an established trail, Mr. Coleman rode across 
a bridge that did not have a ramp on the other side.40  Because of the 
missing ramp, Mr. Coleman fell and was injured.41 
The Oregon Court of Appeals described the accident in very 
general terms, as did the majority opinion of the Oregon Supreme 
Court.  The opinions of these courts state that “[a]fter arriving at the 
park, [Mr. Coleman] and a friend decided to explore the park on their 
mountain bikes.  While on a designated trail, [Mr. Coleman] rode 
over the end of a bridge that lacked a ramp on one side, crashed his 
bike, and broke his neck.”42 
The dissenting opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court provides a 
more vivid picture of the events that transpired.  The dissent described 
the facts surrounding the accident in much greater detail, stating that, 
after arriving at the park and drinking beer, Mr. Coleman and a friend 
 
36 Id. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1147. 
37 Coleman v. Or. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 221 Or. App. 484, 486, 190 P.3d 487, 488 
(2008), rev’d, 347 Or. 94, 217 P.3d 651 (2009). 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
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started to explore the park on their mountain bikes.43  They rode 
down a well-defined wood chip trail and came to a bridge that did not 
have a ramp on the end from which they approached.44  They lifted 
their bikes onto the bridge and rode across, continuing up the trail 
another quarter mile at which time they turned around and headed 
back toward the bridge.45  Mr. Coleman rode his bike back across the 
bridge and off the other side, falling in the process and causing 
himself serious injury.46 
The dissent’s detailed characterization of the facts surrounding the 
accident highlighted the fact that Mr. Coleman drank beer prior to his 
bike ride and that he was aware, well in advance of his injury, that the 
bridge lacked an appropriate ramp on one side.  In so doing, it appears 
that the dissent tried to establish that the trail was in otherwise good 
condition, and, regardless of the trail’s condition, that Mr. Coleman 
had actual notice of the danger and may have exhibited comparative 
negligence to some degree.  It is unclear from the facts whether Mr. 
Coleman was intoxicated to the point that his judgment was affected, 
but it is clear that the dissent found his alcohol consumption and 
knowledge of the existence of the danger to be of some importance. 
IV 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Trial Court 
1.  Arguments Before the Trial Court 
At trial, the plaintiffs alleged that it was negligent for the State to 
leave a two-and-one-half-foot drop-off at the end of the bridge, to 
leave a bridge open to the public while in that condition, and to fail to 
warn the public of the dangerous condition of the bridge.47 
 
43 Coleman v. Or. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 347 Or. 94, 105, 217 P.3d 651, 657 (2009) 
(Balmer, J., dissenting). 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Coleman, 221 Or. App. at 486–87, 190 P.3d at 488.  In addition to the negligence 
claims, Mrs. Coleman also alleged loss of consortium resulting from Mr. Coleman’s 
injuries.  Id. at 487, 190 P.3d at 488.  The State contended that Mrs. Coleman’s loss of 
consortium claim was barred because she did not provide proper notice to the State 
apprising them of her intent to assert the claim.  Id. at 487 n.2, 190 P.3d at 488 n.2.  The 
trial court found the State’s argument persuasive and granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment with regard to the loss of consortium claim.  Id. 
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The State’s theory of the case had two bases in support of its 
motion for summary judgment: recreational immunity and 
discretionary immunity.48  First, the State contended that the 
recreational immunity applied, effectively shielding the State from 
liability on the claims.49  The State argued that the immunity statutes 
applied because the fee charged for the Colemans to camp did not 
constitute a “charge for permission to use the land” under ORS 
105.688(2)(a).50  The State alleged that if “the public is permitted to 
enter or go upon the land without paying a fee, no ‘charge’ is 
imposed.”51  The State then reasoned that the immunity must apply 
because there was no “charge” to enter or go upon the land.52  The 
State further argued that this remains the case even if a fee is imposed 
thereafter for engaging in a specific recreational activity on the land.53  
Essentially, the State’s position was that, because a person could use 
the park without incurring a fee, there was no charge to “enter or go 
upon the land.”  Further, any fee subsequently imposed for camping 
still did not constitute a charge to “enter or go upon the land” because 
entry was free; it was only a particular use of the land once entry was 
made that resulted in a fee. 
The plaintiffs opposed the motion, adopting the opposite position 
that the fee charged for camping “satisfied the definition of a ‘charge 
for permission to use the land.’”54  In response, the State asserted that 
the plaintiffs’ construction of ORS 105.688(2)(a) “ignores the . . . 
definition of ‘charge.’”55  Additionally, the State made the alternative 
argument that immunity is retained “unless the injury arises out of the 
particular use for which the fee is charged.”56 
The State’s second contention was that the decisions regarding the 
maintenance of the bridge were discretionary and, as such, were 
afforded discretionary immunity.57  Discretionary immunity provides 
that public bodies and their officers, employees, and agents are 
immune from liability for “[a]ny claim based upon the performance of 
 
48 Id. at 487 & n.2, 190 P.3d at 488 & n.2. 
49 Id. at 487, 190 P.3d at 488. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 489, 190 P.3d at 489. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 487, 190 P.3d at 488. 
55 Id. at 489, 190 P.3d at 489. 
56 Id. 489 n.4, 190 P.3d at 489 n.4. 
57 Id. at 487 n.2, 190 P.3d at 487 n.2. 
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or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, 
whether or not the discretion is abused.”58 
2.  Trial Court Holding 
Judge Richard L. Barron of the Coos County Circuit Court granted 
the State’s motion for summary judgment with respect to recreational 
immunity, dismissing the complaint.59  The trial court did not 
consider the discretionary immunity defense because the court was 
able to dispose of the complaint on the recreational immunity basis.60 
B.  Oregon Court of Appeals 
On appeal, the court of appeals discussed the immunity provided 
under ORS 105.682 and the public policy rationale for its recognition.  
Ultimately, the decision of the court of appeals hinged on the meaning 
of ORS 105.688(2)(a).  After undergoing an extensive statutory 
construction analysis, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.61  The court reasoned that, “unless the state impose[d] a 
‘charge for permission to use’ Tugman State Park within the meaning 
of ORS 105.688(2)(a), the state” would be afforded recreational 
immunity.62  The statute provides that “charge” is defined as “the 
admission price or fee asked by any owner in return for permission to 
enter or go upon the owner’s land.”63  The court’s analysis required 
giving meaning to the definition of “go upon.”64  The plaintiff 
asserted that the State’s fee to camp constituted a charge to go upon 
the land of the State.65  In giving effect to the term “go upon,” the 
court turned to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to 
define the terms “go” and “upon.”66  The court found that “[g]o . . . 
means ‘to move on a course : pass from point to point or station to 
station; . . . to be in motion.’”67  The court further determined that 
 
58 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(3)(c) (2005). 
59 Coleman, 221 Or. App. at 487, 190 P.3d at 487. 
60 Id. at 487 n.2, 190 P.3d at 487 n.2. 
61 Id. at 490–92, 190 P.3d at 490–91. 
62 Id. at 489, 190 P.3d at 489. 
63 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.672(1) (2005)). 
64 Id. at 490, 190 P.3d at 490. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 971 (unabr. ed. 2002)). 
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“[u]pon” generally “means ‘on’ and ‘on’ ordinarily is ‘used as a 
function word to indicate position over and in contact with that which 
supports from beneath.’”68  The court concluded that “to ‘go upon the 
land’ means to move on a course over or in contact with the land.”69 
Next, the court determined whether the fee charged was to “go 
upon” the State’s land.70  Armed with this definition, the court 
considered whether the fee for camping was “a fee to move on a 
course over and in contact with the land, as [Mr. Coleman] was doing 
when he was injured.”71  The court found that the public may go upon 
the entire parcel of land comprising the park and that the payment of 
the fee was required only to partake in a specific activity upon a 
certain portion of the land.72  The court concluded that “the fee 
merely entitles a member of the public to do something on the land 
while moving about on the land that another may not do.”73  The 
court held that, because the fee charged is only to participate in an 
activity upon the land and not “to enter or move on a course over and 
in contact with the land,” the landowner has not charged for use of the 
land under the terms of the statute.74 
C.  Oregon Supreme Court 
On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, the majority described the 
plaintiff’s position as asserting that camping is “a ‘recreational 
purpose’ under ORS 105.672(5).”75  The court found that the 
plaintiffs asserted that, when a landowner charges for use of any 
aspect of the land, the landowner has required payment “for 
permission to use the land” and, therefore, is not immune from 
liability.76  The necessary implication of this assertion is that, “when 
the landowner imposes any charge to use the land, the landowner no 
longer is making its land available for the public’s recreational use 
without payment.”77 
 
68 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2517, 1574 (unabr. ed. 2002)). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 490–91, 190 P.3d at 490. 
72 Id. at 491, 190 P.3d at 490. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Coleman v. Or. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 347 Or. 94, 99, 217 P.3d 651, 653 (2009). 
76 Id. at 99, 217 P.3d at 654. 
77 Id. 
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The majority characterized the State’s position before the trial 
court and the court of appeals as asserting that the camping fee did 
not meet the statutory definition of “charge.”78  The court found that 
the State argued that the “charge” must be “money that a landowner 
requires a person to pay before that person is allowed access to the 
land, not a fee that a landowner requires a person to pay to make a 
particular use of the land after the person has entered the land.”79  
Because the fee to camp was not a fee charged for entry or access, it 
did not meet the statutory definition of “charge”; therefore, the State 
believed it was entitled to recreational immunity.80 
Interestingly, on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, the State 
changed its argument.81  Rather than continue arguing that the fee did 
not constitute a charge to go upon the land of the State, the State 
contended that a different result was dictated by the inclusion of the 
words “the land” in ORS 105.688(2)(a).82  The State argued that, 
even if the fee exacted for camping was “a charge for permission to 
use” Tugman Park, the charge was only for permission to use the 
campground, not for permission to use the trails.83  Essentially the 
State’s contention was that the park was, in actuality, a divided parcel 
and the land on which the fee was charged was not “the land” on 
which Mr. Coleman was injured under the meaning of ORS 
105.688(2)(a).84  The State claimed that, if the landowner does not 
charge to use “the land,” specifically the land upon which the plaintiff 
is injured, the landowner will still be afforded recreational 
immunity.85  In effect, the State made a divided-parcel argument, 
asserting that the Colemans paid to use the campground, and even if 
the campground was an area in which the State would not be afforded 
recreational immunity, Mr. Coleman was injured in the area of the 
park for which a charge is not imposed and, therefore, the State was 
still afforded recreational immunity provided under ORS 
105.682(1).86 
 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 103, 217 P.3d at 654. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 99, 217 P.3d at 654. 
85 Id. at 99–100, 217 P.3d at 654. 
86 Id. at 103, 217 P.3d at 656. 
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V 
HOLDING AND RATIONALE 
At its most fundamental level, the outcome of this case is 
dependent on two issues, statutory interpretation and the 
determination of whether the parcel of land was divided.  In support 
of their positions, both the majority and the dissent engaged in 
statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent regarding the 
statutory provisions at issue in the case.  Not surprisingly, the 
majority and dissent arrived at different conclusions regarding the 
meaning of the statutes and whether the State had proffered evidence 
that the parcel was divided. 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the State charged for 
permission to use the park, and, therefore, the State was not entitled to 
summary judgment based on recreational immunity.87  Justice 
Walters, writing for the majority, considered whether the State had 
demonstrated on summary judgment that it qualified for recreational 
immunity because it “ma[de] no charge for permission to use the 
land.”88  In so doing, the court reversed the Oregon Court of Appeals 
regarding the recreational immunity defense and remanded for further 
proceedings on the loss of consortium claim.89 
1.  Statutory Interpretation 
Ultimately the Oregon Supreme Court discredited the court of 
appeals’ rationale.  In so doing, the court began its analysis in the 
same place the court of appeals began its analysis.90  The court found 
that “charge” means “the admission price or fee asked by an owner in 
return for permission to enter or go upon the owner’s land.”91  The 
court also noted that the parties agreed that “the camping fee was not 
an ‘admission price’ and was not ‘in return for permission to enter’ 
the park.”92  Like the Oregon Court of Appeals, the court had to 
consider “whether the camping fee [was] a fee to ‘go upon’ the state’s 
 
87 Id. at 96, 217 P.3d at 652. 
88 Id. at 99, 217 P.3d at 654 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.688 (2005)). 
89 Id. at 104, 217 P.3d at 656. 
90 Id. at 100, 217 P.3d at 654. 
91 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.672(1) (2005)). 
92 Id. 
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land.”93  In examining the court of appeals’ analysis, the court 
interpreted the court of appeals’ decision as stating that “the 
legislature intended to preclude immunity for a landowner that exacts 
a fee to enter its land to use that land for a recreational purpose, but to 
grant immunity to a landowner that exacts a fee for that recreational 
use.”94 
The majority continued, explaining that the court of appeals’ 
rationale did not reflect legislative intent.95  In conducting its analysis 
under the framework established in PGE v. BOLI, the court looked 
only to the text and context of the statutes,96 deeming it unnecessary 
to consult the legislative history.97  The court found that the immunity 
was intended to be provided to landowners for allowing any person to 
use the land for recreational purposes.98  The court held that the 
landowner’s immunity “arise[s] out of ‘the use of the land for 
recreational purposes.’”99  “[I]t is the landowners’ permission to use 
and the public’s use that give rise to recreational immunity . . . .”100  
Therefore, it would be illogical to interpret the legislative intent to 
disregard fees exacted for permission to use or for the public’s actual 
use in imposing limitations on the application of recreational 
immunity.101 
To further support its holding, the court noted that the words 
following “charge” in ORS 105.688(2)(a) were “for permission to 
use.”102  The word “charge” does not exclude fees charged for 
permission to use land; therefore, the text of the statute suggests that 
the word “charge” “include[s] fees exacted for use of land as well as 
fees exacted for entry to land.”103  In addition, the court pointed to the 
fact that “a person moves over or on land when he or she enters the 
land, but a person also moves over or on land when he or she makes 
 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 101, 217 P.3d at 655. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 100, 217 P.3d at 655. 
97 Id. at 100 n.4, 217 P.3d at 654 n.4. 
98 Id. at 101, 217 P.3d at 655. 
99 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682(1) (2005)). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.688(2)(a) (2005)). 
103 Id. 
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use of that land for recreational purposes.”104  The court continued, 
stating that “‘charge’ encompasses both fees to enter land and fees to 
use land as long as that use entails moving over or on the land for a 
recreational purpose.”105  The court further bolstered its position by 
referring to the way that ORS 105.688(2)(c) interacts with paragraph 
(a) of the same statute.  Paragraph (c) states that the “recreational 
immunity applies only if ‘[t]he owner charges no more than $75 per 
cord for permission to use the land for woodcutting.’”106  The court 
continued by illustrating that, when read together, “to qualify for 
immunity, a landowner must impose no fee to enter or use its land, 
except a fee of less than $75 per cord to use the land for 
woodcutting.”107  In the court’s opinion, if the legislature had wanted 
to grant immunity to landowners who charge minimal fees for 
recreational use other than cutting wood, the legislature certainly 
could have done so.108 
In summarizing its rationale, the court stated that “[a] person 
moves over and on the land to camp on it, and camping is a 
recreational purpose.  Therefore, the state made a charge for 
permission to use Tugman Park and thus forfeited recreational 
immunity.”109  The fact that the activity engaged in at the time of the 
injury was not the activity for which the fee was exacted is 
irrelevant.110  If a landowner is entitled to recreational immunity 
under ORS 105.682(1), that “immunity extends as long as the injured 
person’s principal purpose for entry is recreational, even if the person 
was engaged in other nonrecreational activity at the time of 
injury.”111  ORS 105.688(2)(a) was interpreted similarly.112  To retain 
their immunity, landowners “must make no charge for permission to 
use the land.”113  Where a landowner charges to use the land, 
immunity does not apply, even if the injury occurs while the user is 
engaged in some activity other than that which was the basis for the 
 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 102, 217 P.3d at 655. 
106 Id. at 102, 217 P.3d at 655 (alteration in original) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 
105.688(2)(c) (2005)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 102, 217 P.3d at 656. 
113 Id. 
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charge to use the property.114  In short, where a “landowner makes a 
charge to use a park for camping, the landowner forfeits its immunity, 
even if a camper is injured while biking” outside the campground but 
within the confines of the park.115 
2.  Consideration of the State’s New Argument 
In analyzing the State’s new argument, that the land Mr. Coleman 
was injured on is not the land for which a fee was imposed, the 
majority examined the meaning of the term “land” as it is used in the 
applicable statutes.  The court found that “land” is a statutorily 
defined term, meaning “all real property, whether publicly or 
privately owned.”116  In support of its position, the State contended 
that “real property” includes both the entire parcel of land as well as 
any distinct piece of land within that parcel.117  Further, the State 
argued that the use of the article “the” by the legislature was 
indicative of “the legislature condition[ing] immunity on a 
landowner’s making no charge for use of ‘the’ distinct part of the land 
on which the injury occurred.”118  While the majority acknowledged 
the potential for the State’s argument, it determined that there was no 
need to address the issue in the present case.119  The court held that 
the State did not establish on summary judgment that there were two 
distinct pieces of land with identifiable boundaries, one of which was 
open to the public for free and the other which allowed access only to 
those who paid to use it.120  Further, the State did not establish that, as 
campers, the plaintiffs were limited to using only the land for which 
the charge was imposed.121 
In summary, after conducting its statutory construction analysis, 
the court determined that the fee charged for camping was a fee to go 
upon the land of the State.  Because the State did not proffer evidence 
below that the land was distinctly divided into multiple portions, the 
court did not consider the issue.  As such, the court determined that 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 102–03, 217 P.3d at 656. 
116 Id. at 103, 217 P.3d at 656 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.672(3) (2005)). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 103–04, 217 P.3d at 656. 
121 Id. at 104, 217 P.3d at 656. 
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the land was an undivided parcel; therefore, a fee to use one portion 
of the parcel constituted a charge to use the land as a whole.  The 
court’s decision not to consider whether the parcel was divided 
effectively avoided one of the most outcome-determinative issues in 
the case. 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Balmer dissented and was joined by Justices Kistler and 
Linder.  The dissent disagreed with the majority regarding whether 
the immunity applies to the entire parcel of land or only the portion of 
the parcel for which the fee is paid.  The dissent also arrived at a 
different conclusion regarding whether the State established below 
that the land at issue was a divided parcel. 
1.  Statutory Interpretation 
On the issue of statutory interpretation, the dissent characterized 
the majority’s opinion as holding that, “if a landowner charges a fee 
for the use of one part of its land, the landowner may not assert 
recreational use immunity as to a user who pays the fee, even for 
injuries that occur on other land that is open for recreational use 
without any charge.”122  The dissent continued, stating that the 
statutory language does not support the majority’s interpretation and 
that such an interpretation “will significantly limit the immunity that 
the legislature intended to confer on landowners.”123  Further, the 
dissent claimed that such an interpretation will also lead to 
“anomalous results.”124  While the dissent disagreed with the 
majority’s holding that a fee charged to use Tugman Park for camping 
precludes application of recreational immunity to the entire park, it 
did concede that the word “charge” was correctly interpreted to 
include fees for entering or using land as long as the use entails 
moving over or on the land for a recreational purpose.125 
In conducting its own statutory construction analysis, the dissent 
found language in two statutes particularly revealing in reaching its 
determination that a fee imposed for the use of one portion of a parcel 
did not constitute a waiver of the immunity for the remaining portions 
of the parcel.  First, the dissent noted the wording of ORS 105.682(1), 
 
122 Id. at 104, 217 P.3d at 657 (Balmer, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 104–05, 217 P.3d at 657. 
124 Id. at 106, 217 P.3d at 657. 
125 Id. (quoting majority opinion at 101–02). 
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which states that immunity is provided for an injury “that arises out of 
the use of the land for recreational purposes, . . . when the owner of 
land either directly or indirectly permits any person to use the land for 
recreational purposes.”126  Second, the dissent noted the language of 
ORS 105.688(2)(a), which provides that the immunity applies only 
when “the owner makes no charge for permission to use the land.”127  
In conducting its statutory interpretation, the dissent read these 
statutes to mean that, if a landowner charges to use one part of his 
land, the immunity is not available for an injury that arises from 
recreational use of that portion of the land.128  However, where an 
injury occurs on the portion of the land that was not paid for, the 
immunity is available to protect the landowner.129  The dissent 
continued, “[t]he legislature’s use of the definite article ‘the’ suggests 
that the legislature did not intend the immunity (or lack of immunity) 
to apply to all land that may be owned by a landowner, but rather to 
some specific part of the landowner’s land.”130 
2.  Consideration of the State’s New Argument 
Upon consideration of the State’s new argument, the dissent found 
the argument—that the State did not charge to use “the land” upon 
which Mr. Coleman was injured, and it was thus entitled to the benefit 
of recreational immunity—to be persuasive.131  Finding statutory 
support for limiting the immunity waiver in both undivided- and 
divided-parcel cases, the dissent then turned to discrediting the 
majority’s rejection of the State’s new claim. 
The dissent stated that there was no basis for the majority’s 
conclusion that the land was not divided into two distinct parcels.132  
The dissent pointed to the fact that, while the plaintiffs were entitled 
to use the entire park due to their status as campers, they would have 
been able to use all areas of the park, other than the campground, 
even without paying a fee.133  As members of the nonpaying public, 
 
126 Id. at 106, 217 P.3d at 658 (alternation in original) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 
105.682(1) (2005)). 
127 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.688(2)(a) (2005)). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 107, 217 P.3d at 658. 
131 Id. at 106, 217 P.3d at 657–58. 
132 Id. at 108 n.6, 217 P.3d at 658 n.6. 
133 Id. at 108, 217 P.3d at 658–59. 
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the plaintiffs would have been able to use the trails upon which Mr. 
Coleman was injured in the exact same way as patrons paying for a 
campsite.134  In what is the dissent’s most valid argument, the dissent 
explained that to hold as the majority did allows for the anomalous 
conclusion that the State may assert the recreational immunity against 
a person who is injured in Tugman Park if he is not paying to camp, 
but it may not assert the immunity against a person paying to camp 
who is injured in the same place, under the same circumstances.135  
Further, the dissent believed that the statutes did not require the land 
to be subdivided through the use of notices, signs, or fences.136  
Despite this fact, the maps submitted to the trial court demonstrated 
that the campground was a separate area from the trails, complete 
with “a registration booth at the entry point, showers, and 
restrooms.”137 
In summary, after conducting its own statutory construction 
analysis, the dissent determined that a charge imposed to use one 
portion of a parcel does not preclude recreational immunity from 
being applied to the other portions of the parcel, regardless of whether 
the parcel is divided or not.  Under the dissent’s interpretation of 
legislative intent, whether the State established that the parcel was 
divided was irrelevant. 
VI 
IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Majority and Dissenting Opinion Analysis 
Both the majority and the dissent present plausible interpretations 
of the legal issues presented in this case, but despite their best efforts, 
both the majority’s holding and the dissent’s opinion create some 
issues of their own.  The majority’s position appears proper in 
undivided-parcel cases.  Where the parcel is truly undivided, a fee 
imposed to use one portion of the parcel should waive the immunity 
as to the entire piece of land.  The trouble with the court’s holding is 
that the dissent correctly characterizes this as a divided-parcel case.  
While what constitutes sufficient division of a piece of land is not 
currently defined, it is hard to imagine how a piece of land separated 
 
134 Id. at 108, 217 P.3d at 659. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 109, 217 P.3d at 659. 
137 Id. 
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into two portions, one of which requires a fee for use while the other 
does not, can be held to be an undivided parcel.  It appears that the 
court avoided a critical issue in this case by not considering whether 
the land was a divided parcel. 
1.  Concerns with the Majority Opinion 
As has already been alluded to, one significant flaw exists with 
regard to the majority opinion, and it is directly related to the debate 
over whether the land in the present case is a divided parcel or not.  
The dissent calls attention to the fact that the majority opinion may 
provide for anomalous results where parcels contain separate portions 
but are treated as an undivided whole.  In the present case, the 
majority opinion allows the Colemans to recover against the State 
because they paid to use one portion of an undivided parcel and were 
injured while using the other portion that was open to the public 
without charge.  Conversely, a person using only the free portion of 
the parcel who was injured in the same place and in the same manner 
would not be allowed to recover for their injuries due to the State’s 
ability to invoke recreational immunity.  While the statutes appear to 
support the dissent’s characterization of how a case involving a 
plaintiff who was not charged a fee would be resolved, it is unclear 
what the majority’s rationale is in allowing for such an anomaly. 
An alternative reading of the statutes indicates that the immunity 
may be waived even where the plaintiff did not pay to use the land.  
The statutes merely state that the immunity is waived where a 
landowner charges for use of the land.  The statutes do not require 
that the landowner charge the particular plaintiff to constitute a 
waiver of the recreational immunity, just that they charge for use of 
the land.  Under this interpretation of the statute, in an undivided-
parcel case where the landowner charges for use of one portion of the 
land, that charge constitutes a waiver as to the whole parcel, whether 
the user is the one paying the charge or not.  Essentially the waiver 
would attach to the land rather than to the individual paying to use the 
land.  Under this reading of the statutes, the majority’s holding no 
longer leads to the anomalous results suggested by the dissent.  The 
fact that the State charged people to use a portion of the parcel would 
result in the State waiving the recreational immunity for the entire 
parcel for any person using the land for recreational purposes.  
Admittedly, the 2007 revisions to ORS 105.672(1) call this 
interpretation into question.  Under the revised statute, “charge” is 
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defined as “the admission price or fee requested or expected by an 
owner in return for granting permission for a person to enter or go 
upon the owner’s land.”138  This change in the statutory language 
seemingly clarifies whether the immunity is precluded as to any user 
or only to one who has paid to use the land. 
Regardless of how the statutes are interpreted, the anomalous 
results described by the dissent would be resolved if the land in the 
present case was held to be a divided parcel.  Given this 
understanding, the simple solution to resolve this issue in similar 
cases is for landowners to clearly separate the portions of their land 
for which a fee is imposed and the portion that a user may enjoy for 
free.  While this solution appears simple, what will constitute 
sufficient notice of a divided parcel remains unclear. 
2.  Concerns with the Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion presents two troubling issues of its own.  
First, the dissent’s statutory interpretation rested on the notion that, if 
the legislature intended the statutes to have the meaning given to them 
by the majority, it could have explicitly stated such an intent.  Second, 
the immunity should be applied to free portions of land in non-
delineated divided-parcel cases. 
The dissent indicated that the majority’s holding regarding a fee for 
one portion of the land waiving immunity for the entire parcel is not 
supported by legislative intent.  Essentially, the dissent argued that, if 
the legislature desired such an outcome, it could have explicitly 
worded the statutes to reflect this intent.  However, the dissent failed 
to acknowledge that its argument suffers from the same problem.  The 
dissent stated that the legislature’s use of the word “the” reflects its 
desire to have the immunity waived only to “that” particular portion 
of the parcel for which a fee was paid.  The dissent’s reading of the 
statutes, while plausible, is subject to debate.  Applying the same 
rationale the dissent used to discredit the majority’s statutory 
interpretation, the legislature could have used the word “that” as 
opposed to “the,” as the dissent did in its explanation of its statutory 
interpretation.  In the opinion of the majority, the use of the words 
“the land” implies the entire parcel of land.  If, as the dissent suggests, 
the legislature intended the immunity to apply only to the portion of 
the parcel for which a fee was paid, the legislature could have dictated 
 
138 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.672(1) (2007) (emphasis added). 
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that the immunity was waived only for “that land” for which the fee 
was paid. 
The dissent also stated that the statutes do not require any form of 
demarcation between portions of the land requiring payment of a 
usage fee and portions that are free.  While the statutes do not 
explicitly require overt divisions of land, such a holding would create 
incredible ambiguity.  Where parcels of land are not clearly 
delineated, as was the case here, how can application of the immunity 
be determined after the fact?  How would a landowner ever know 
what portion of their land was afforded the immunity and what 
portion could be subject to liability?  Admittedly, where land is 
clearly divided between the parcel for which a fee is required for 
entry or use and a parcel which does not require a fee, the dissent’s 
position is tenable.  In fact, the majority opinion explicitly states that 
there may be some merit to this argument.  However, where use of 
one portion of land unencumbered by fees stems from use of a portion 
of land for which there is a fee, the dissent’s rationale appears more 
tenuous. 
On balance, the majority’s holding as to the application of the 
immunity to truly undivided parcels appears correct.  The majority 
opinion falters in its analysis, or lack of analysis, regarding whether 
the parcel at issue in the present case was divided.  As a result, the 
court’s analysis is misapplied given the facts of the case.  Where the 
parcel is divided, the immunity should apply only where a fee is not 
imposed for the portion of land used for recreational purposes. 
B.  Application of the Recreational Immunity After Coleman 
1.  What Will Be the Effect of Divided Land? 
Going forward, where a piece of land is definitively divided into 
two portions, one requiring a usage fee and one not requiring a fee, 
how will the recreational immunity be applied?  The immunity should 
apply to the portion of the land not requiring payment of a usage fee 
and should not apply to the portion for which a landowner charges a 
usage fee.  Applying this approach to the facts in the present case, if 
the portions of the park were clearly delineated between the fee-
charging campground and the free hiking trails, Mr. Coleman could 
recover for his injuries if sustained in the campground, but the State 
could assert the recreational immunity if his injuries occurred on the 
hiking trails outside of the camping area.  Such an application 
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provides for equitable results regardless of whether the plaintiff is a 
paying user of the land. 
The majority alluded to the fact that a single parcel of land that is 
clearly divided into two or more parcels may be dealt with differently 
under similar circumstances.  It is suggested that if the land is divided 
and the injury occurs on the portion of the land for which a fee was 
not paid, the landowner may still be able to assert the recreational 
immunity despite charging for use of an attached but clearly 
delineated portion of the same parcel of land.  There is no question 
regarding the dissent’s position on this issue.  The dissent definitively 
states that, in cases where the land is divided, whether such division is 
readily apparent or not, the immunity should apply to the portion of 
the parcel for which payment for entry or use was not made and 
should be precluded as to the portion of the parcel for which payment 
was required. 
Although it is not binding, given the strength of the dissent’s 
argument and the majority’s apparent inclination toward recognizing 
applicability of the immunity in divided-parcel cases, it is likely that 
subsequent cases involving divided parcels will be decided 
differently.  In future cases courts will likely find that the recreational 
immunity is available where a person is injured while on property that 
he or she did not have to pay to enter or use, even where the person 
had to pay to enter or use an attached but clearly delineated portion of 
land.  The apparent implication for landowners allowing recreational 
use of their land is to unmistakably demarcate the areas for use of 
which a fee is imposed and the areas that may be used without charge. 
While a different outcome is likely in future cases involving 
divided parcels, allowing immunity in divided-parcel cases will create 
a new issue.  The courts will have to devise a way to determine if a 
parcel is clearly divided and, if it is not, what characteristics suggest 
that such a division exists despite a lack of visual cues.  While courts 
frequently make decisions on such subjective determinations, a new 
body of law will have to develop to help courts determine what 
constitutes enough visual notice that the land is divided, and where 
such notice is not overtly provided, what attributes constitute 
constructive notice that such a division exists.  Shaping this new body 
of law will take time, as it is likely that new tests will be articulated 
and new precedent will need to be developed. 
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2.  How Will Use Permits Be Addressed? 
While it is evident that charges imposed by parks for entry or for 
camping where the camping area is not clearly delineated from the 
rest of the park undoubtedly preclude invocation of the recreational 
immunity under the rule announced by the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Coleman, the effect of other fees indirectly charged to use a park is 
not as obvious.  An example of such an indirect fee charged to use a 
park is a “use permit.”  Many parks in the state of Oregon are “free” 
to use but require the purchase of a statewide use permit.  The user of 
any of these parks must purchase a use permit, which entitles them to 
use any of the parks that have adopted that particular permit for some 
specified period of time, often one or two years.  To enjoy any of the 
parks, the user does not have to pay any additional fee but must 
display the appropriate permit.  Use permits present the question of 
whether the permit fee, or some portion thereof, constitutes a charge 
to use the parks. 
One illustration of parks that require use permits are Off-Highway 
Vehicle (OHV) parks such as Browns Camp and Millican Valley.  
These parks allow off-road motor vehicle traffic.  Users are not 
required to pay to use a specific park, but they must purchase an 
Oregon All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) Permit to be able to use their 
vehicles in these parks.139  While the pass allows use of all such OHV 
parks across the state for a two-year period and the user is not paying 
an additional fee imposed for the use of any single park in particular, 
the question arises of whether the fee for the permit will constitute a 
“charge” for use of the park. 
Similarly, many parks in the state of Oregon require a day-use fee 
that seems to clearly fall within the province of immunity preclusion.  
An alternative to paying such day-use fees at individual parks is to 
purchase an annual “Northwest Forest Pass,” which entitles the 
purchaser to avoid paying the day-use fees at some parks and 
trailheads.  Like purchasers of the Oregon ATV Permit, purchasers of 
the Northwest Forest Pass are not paying for the use of a particular 
park, but are paying for the right to use any of the parks that honor the 
pass.  Again, the question arises of whether or not the purchaser has 
been indirectly charged for use of the honoring park. 
 
139 Or. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, ATV Permits (Aug. 23, 2010), 
http://www.oregon.gov/OPRD/ATV/Permits.shtml. 
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Use permits, such as the Oregon ATV Permit and the Northwest 
Forest Pass, should constitute a fee for use of the state’s land.  In the 
case of the Oregon ATV permit, one uses such OHV parks solely for 
recreation involving use of motor vehicles.  Therefore, paying for the 
permit is essentially a requirement of using the park.  While 
purchasing the permit is admittedly not required to go upon the land 
of the park, it is required to use the park for its intended purpose.  
This makes it similar to the charge imposed for camping in the 
present case, as it was a fee imposed to use the land for its intended 
purpose rather than a fee incurred for merely entering or going upon 
the state’s land.  The Northwest Forest Pass similarly, and more 
clearly, seems to be a charge to go upon the state’s land.  After all, the 
pass is just a proxy for the day-use fee that the purchaser would have 
paid had the pass not been purchased. 
While such a holding seems proper, the implications are vast.  An 
injury occurring at these OHV parks from vehicle rollovers, 
collisions, passenger ejections, or any number of other accidents 
would subject the state to liability.  Likewise, liability may be 
imposed on the state where an injury to a Northwest Forest Pass 
purchaser occurs in a park honoring the pass.  Admittedly, there 
would still have to be a basis for the claim, such as negligence, but 
this seems to be an unreasonably low bar given the circumstances 
likely to surround the incident. 
CONCLUSION 
The court’s holding in Coleman has vast implications regarding the 
liability of both private and public landowners who make their 
property available for public use.  The court’s holding seems 
appropriate in the context of an undivided-parcel case, but it appears 
to sidestep a critical factor in this case.  The dissent’s opinion 
correctly states that the parcel of land at issue in the present case is a 
divided parcel.  As such, the majority’s holding that the fee 
constituted a charge for use of the land and that the land was part of 
the same undivided parcel is improper.  Additionally, the court’s 
decision leaves significant issues unresolved.  Issues such as divided 
property and indirect “charge” assessment remain outstanding.  For 
the time being, the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision should alter the 
layout of private and public lands open to the public for recreational 
use.  Landowners of such land, including the state’s parks, should 
unmistakably delineate areas for which a fee is charged for entry or 
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use and clearly distinguish and separate those areas for which no fee 
is required. 
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